ISLAMIC BANKS: CONCEPT, PRECEPT AND PROSPECTS
Muhammad
Nejatullah Siddiqi
Centre for
Research in Islamic Economics
King Abdulaziz
University
Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia
Islamic Banks: Concept, Precept and
Prospects*
Introduction
ÿÿÿÿMuch
has happened in the world ofbanking
andfinancesincethispaper was written in 1996. Then its focus
was to convince shariahscholars and
asection of laymen that financial
intermediation was a necessity and the Islamic banks were there to perform that
function. Now, beyond that, thereis a
needtoemphasise'innovation'
includinginnovative ways offinancialintermediation. Even though athoroughrevision of thepaperÿ
has notbeenpossible anupdatinghas beendoneby adding a few lines as well as a post-script and many new references.
The Problem
ÿÿÿÿAre
Islamic Banks losing credibility? Why they are not as efficient as other
financial institutions in responding to the needs of their clients and earning
good returns for their depositors? These two questions seem to have been in
focus in several recent attempts at a review of Islamic banks.1 The exercise is notmerely academic. At stake is the future of
the most dynamic venture in Islam in the second half of the twentieth century,
as also are billions of dollars entrusted to these institutions.
_______________________________
*ÿÿÿThis paper was
originally presented to a seminar organised by the Research Centre, Al Rajhi
Banking and Investment Corporation, in June 1996. Its Arabic translation
appeared in the Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, Vol.
10, 1419/1998, pp. 43-59.
ÿÿÿÿWe
do not propose toanswerthesequestionsdirectly in this brief
exposition. Rather we look at the vision for possible deficiency and the
current structure for possible fault lines, that may be at the root of these
andother problems being confronted by
the Islamic banks. The first question to be discussed is: are Islamic banks to
be financial intermediaries or should they operate as traders, producersand business men in their own right.2 Affirming their role asintermediaries we thenproceed to a close examination of what
isinvolved infinancialintermediation. Identifying itsessence as the division of labour and specialization which have been the
engines of progress throughout human history, its efficiency in promoting human
felicity through expandingproduction
and reducing costs is noted. It is argued that modern society cannot function
without financial intermediation and that it is a must for any contemporary
Islamic society. Islamic banks being best equipped to perform the function can
not leave it to others. In practice they tend more and more towards involvement
in direct business. This may ease the take over of financial services by aliens
and marginalize Islamic banks. A change of course in called for.
Islamic Banks as Financial
Intermediaries
ÿÿÿÿThere
were Muslim traders, producers and businessmen before Islamic banks were
established. Some of these were using other people's money by making them
shareholders or sleeping partners. Trading in goods and services was not what
Islamic banks were conceived for. Rather they were expected to supply Muslims
with the same services the conventional banks were supplying, so that Muslims
could avoid paying or receiving interest and still be able to earn profits on
their savings or get finance for their business, etc.
/span>ÿÿÿÿ The business of
bankshasbeenfinancialintermediation although they have also been
doingotheroddjobs that go easily
withtheirmain job without affecting it adversely. The main task is to
mobilizeÿ savingsfrommillions of income earners in the form of deposits and to make funds
available tothousandsofbusinessmenforinvestment. Even thoughsomeotherinstitutions also serve
asintermediaries,as weshallseebelow, banks are the most easily accessible
financial intermediaries for the common man. If banks do not perform thisfunctionaverylarge section of the population will suffer since onlybankstakewithdrawabledeposits which the common man has to have in
any case. It is also difficult for a large section of population to handle
shares, securities and other financial instruments. Let us have a closer look
at financial intermediation.
Nature and Significance of
Financial Intermediation
ÿÿÿÿThose
who save and accumulate some money look for an opportunity for making more
money by investing their savings. Those who are doingbusiness are looking for funds they could use. They are willing
to bear the cost. In interest based system the cost is, more often than not, in
the form of a predetermined rate of interest. In interest-free system it would
be a share in the profits accruing on the use of the funds. Whether the system
is interest-based or interest-free, if these two kinds of peoplewere to search for one another and make a
deal they would have great difficulty. There would have to be a coincidence
relating to the size of the funds and the time period for which they are needed
and offered. A business man will have to deal with a number of fund owners
before he can get the amount of funds required. This would take time. A fund
owner would have to approach a number of businessmen before he can find one who
accepts his money for the time period it is offered. Also, failing a perfect
coincidence in time period for which funds are demanded and supplied it may be
difficult to ensure continuous supply and use of funds. Then there are the more
difficult matters related to risk. As we note below there are different kinds
of risks involved in investing funds for profit, some of them not easy to
comprehend. Given coincidence relating to size and time many projects may not
suit a particular fund owner because of their risk profile. Apart from business
risks there is also the risk of default, even the fear of outright fraud. Faced
with these problems many small individual savers will be looking for some one
they know and trust, some one in the neighborhood. All this couldcausedelay and results in (un intended) hoarding.
ÿÿÿÿDirect
finance in which there is a direct deal betweenfund owner (saver) and fund user (investor) is inefficient. Its
inefficiency has rightly beencompared
to the inefficiency of barter.3Also if fund owners have toseekoutfundusers andfund users haveto search for
fund owners the net return to thefundownerswouldbe substantially lower than the gross cost of fundsto users. Fundowners willsubtractsearch costs together with any risk premiums
due to theuncertainty about the fund
users trust worthiness.4
Lower returns onfunds will discourage
savings. High cost offundswilldiscourage investment. The overall consequences for the economy will be
smaller volume of production, fewer jobs, lower incomes and a weaker economy as
compared to what is achievable throughfinancialintermediation.Intermediation is rightly regarded to be
welfare enhancing.5
Role of Financial Intermediaries
ÿÿÿÿFinancial
intermediaries are able to remove the inefficiencies of direct finance in a
number of ways. Financial intermediation enables aseparationbetween the
decision to save and the decision to invest in real production. Since the latter
requires much more information and expertise than available to ordinary savers,
their division of labor and specialization increases the wealth ofnations. Separationÿ betweenthese two functions and a distancing betweenmanagement of the financial sector of the economy and that of its
real sector has now become an inalienable feature of the modern economy. The
real sector expands when those acting in that sector getcommandoverresourcesat acceptable terms. Acceptability has
severaldimensions: time horizon, size
of fund, risk, cost, speed and flexibility are some of these dimensions. The
relative importance of a dimension differs from business to business. But
competition makes entrepreneurs always to seek to improve upon the package they
already have. Thecompetitivepressure originates mainly in the hearts and
minds of people who are seeking better products at cheaper prices with such
other services as make the deal attractive (guaranteed quality, quick delivery,
maintenance and repair and continuity in supply etc.)
ÿÿÿÿInvolved
in this separation is alsoaninstitutionalization ofthe process not known in earlier periods of
history. Institutions rather than individual middlemen take over the
mobilization of savings and their transfer to users in real economy. Thevarious steps involved in this process of
transferringfunds fromultimate saver to ultimate user are divided
and subdivided into functionsthroughwhichspecialized functionaries reduce costs,
improve services and tailor the 'financial product' to the needs andpreferences of both parties: fund owners as
well as fund users.
ÿÿÿÿIt
is important for us, people in the Islamic economic and financial community, to
realize that the above mentioned developments are neither caused by interest
nor do they depend on interest. Separation of saving and investment and
institutionalization of the process of transferring funds for use in real
production are theoutcomeofdivision of labor and specialization. What is new is the unprecedented
acceleration of the process because of the revolutionary changes in technology
relating to communication and information. Financial services of almost every
kind can be organized without interest. In fact many of these services already
operateon bases other than interest
e.g., commission, fees, share in profits, etc.
ÿÿÿÿBeside
effecting separation between saving and investment and institutionalizing the
process of transferring funds, financial intermediation attends to the
obstacles in direct finance noted above i.e. those relating to time, size,
speed in deal making, cost reduction, risks and moral hazard, etc.
ÿÿÿÿIntermediaries
solve the problem of mismatch in the size of funds available with a saver and
that required by a businessman by pooling. From a huge pool of deposits into
which funds are pouring in continuously (assuming net growth in deposits
despite withdrawals). They are thus able to offer the users the amount of money
they want.
ÿÿÿÿFund
owners are generally reluctant to tie their funds for long periods of time.
Businessesneedfundsforlongerperiodsthan savers want to tie funds for. Intermediaries solve the problem by
proper management of their portfolios learning from their past experience. In
offering funds for longer periods of time than their deposits have been made
for, intermediaries arebanking not
only oncontinuedadditions to their pool but also on
interbank facilities ensuring continued ability to meet withdrawals by
depositors.
ÿÿÿÿThere
is a wide variety of risks involved in investment. Production risks relate to
particular projects. Price risks relate to the market. Exchange rate risks are
important for export related industries while currency risks are important in
view of cost of imported ingredients and due to its effects on domestic value
of money. Credit risks relate to repayment of loans and amounts receivable. It
is an expert's job to assess a particular risk, but the crucial factor is
information which is generally availableonly at a cost. Intermediaries can afford the costs which individual
fund owners can not afford. Competition between the intermediarieskeeps the cost oftheir services in line with cost of similar services.6
ÿÿÿÿOne
important dimension of risk management is to transfer a risk, or part of it,
from those not willing to take it to those willing to take it in expectation of
profit. By doing so the financial intermediaries increase the volume of
investment.
/span>ÿÿÿÿ Profit sharingbased transfer of funds from owners to users
will require monitoring of the actual use7, the account keeping of the project concerned, etc. While it will
be impossible for individual fund owners to do so, especially for the small
fund owners, financialintermediariescould afford to
do so as the cost would be spread over large number of funds. They can also
devise special ways and means of monitoring with the cooperation of fund users
and the authorities supervising and regulating financial markets.
As we noted above, direct deals
between fund users and fund owners would be slow. Not sowithfinancialintermediation.
Pooling, a continuous stream of deposits and the safety net provided by the
financialindustryand the supervisory and regulatory
authorities enables them to be ready to respond quicklyto users', aswellas fund owners' call
any time, any where.
ÿÿÿÿAll
this makes financial intermediation not only superior to direct finance but
also a condition for progress.Modern
economies can no longer suffer the slow, high cost and risky financing that
would obtain in the absence of financial intermediation.
Financial Intermediation in Islamic
Society
ÿÿÿÿFinancialintermediationinan Islamic economy is
a must in today's competitive global economy. A fast growing modern economy is
unimaginable in a society without financial intermediaries. It will be no
exaggeration to say that the fate of a society that eliminates financial
intermediationwould be no different
from the fate of a society that seeks to abolish the use of money.
ÿÿÿÿLet
us posit a contemporary Islamic economy that has no financial intermediaries.
People save.Islamic banks mobilize
these savings through investment accounts and use these funds to do business,
directly or in partnership with other businessmen. Two things will follow.
/span>ÿÿÿÿ Firstly,Islamic banks will be exposed to all kinds
of risks to which business is exposed and this exposure will be carried back to
depositors ininvestment accounts. The
subdivision and dispersion of risks that a number of institutionalized risk
takers make possible will not be feasiblebecauseof the direct deal
between Islamic banks in custody of depositors' money and producers,businessmen in the real sector. Given a
spectrum of risk aversion, saving will decline.
ÿÿÿÿSecondly,innovators,entrepreneursand businessmen
may find it hard to finance their projects since financiers (Islamic banks)
would generally avoid taking big risks. Also Islamic bankswouldpreferexercisingsomecontrol over the projects through partnership, forexample.Inany case finance from Islamic
banks to real business would notflowaseasilyandquicklyasincaseofintermediation.Asaresultofall this real investment will decline.
ÿÿÿÿIf
it were a closed economy business would shrink, production decline, employment
go down and incomes fall.Butthereneitherisnorcan be a closed economy in today's world. So businessmen who could not
strike a deal with Islamic banks will look elsewhere for finance. Also
depositors averse to risk levels involved in investment accounts will look
elsewhere for parking their savings.NonIslamicfinancial institutions will step in to take
advantage of the situation. Islamicbanking will be marginalized, soon to be competed out of the main
market. Itsvestigeswillberelegatedtothebye lanesofthebazaar with a captive market
of its own.
/span>ÿÿÿÿ No bodywantsthatscenario. Islamic banks
were supposed to provide a model which could by emulated by others and adopted
by the authorities in the Muslim majority countries, to begin with. It is not
advisable they eschew a function so vital for the society and be content with
the minor role of doing business to earn some profit for their depositors.
ÿÿÿÿWe
suggest thatfinancialintermediation is anecessity (darurah) in the full
technical sense of the Shariahterm.If an Islamic society does
not have financial intermediaries it will either become weak andwither away or people alien to that society
will take over the function of financialintermediation with dire consequences for its financial as well as
monetary system.
ÿÿÿÿWe
also suggest that Islamic banks are theinstitutions most qualified to perform the function of financial
intermediation. No other Islamic institution can do so. No other conventional
institution (stock market, insurance companies, mutual funds, etc.) can do it
in the Islamic way.
ÿÿÿÿIt
follows that Islamic banks are duty bound to perform financial intermediation.
An Islamic society is duty bound to be of sound economic health so that the
basic needs of its people are fulfilled and it can defend itself frominternaldeviationsand external agressions.8 There can be no sound economic
healthwithoutfinancial intermediation. 'What is necessary
for discharging a duty is itself a duty'.9Thisdutyfalls on those equipped to do it.
ÿÿÿÿThis
in our view is a sufficient argument making it obligatory for Islamic banks to
perform financial intermediation. Our case is further strengthened by the fact
that financial intermediation is not entirely unknown to Islamicsociety in its early centuries. Direct
finance was no doubt the dominant mode of finance. But the practice of one
obtaining finance on the basis of profit-sharing then giving it to another
person, the actual user of funds, on the basis of profit-sharing is also
recognized.10
Non bank financial Intermediariesÿ
ÿÿÿÿBanks
are not the only actors in the financial market. Stock markets, Mutual Funds,
Insurance Companies, PensionFunds,
Savings and Loan Societies or Building Societies, etc. also serve as
financialintermediaries. Theydeserve a brieflookbefore we return to
our main subject, intermediation by Islamic banks, especially because their
role is on the increase whereas the role of commercial banks may decline11.
ÿÿÿÿThe
stock market offers an opportunity to buyandsell shares. Savers invest
for profit by buying sharesthroughlicensedbrokers. Business firms acquire finance by floating sharesthroughspecializedagencies. Transferoffunds from its owners to its users through this channel is indirect
andmorerisky ascompared to that
by banks. But the stock market performs a usefulservice ofassessingthecurrent value of a company byputtingapriceonitsshares. This'information'isavailable to all free of cost. It helps
individual savers, institutional fundkeepers (e.g. Provident Funds, Pensions Funds etc.)andÿ
foreigninvestorstodecideÿ where toplacetheirsavingsinordertobenefit from expected dividends and capital
gains.
ÿÿÿÿMutual
Funds or Unit Trusts offer the service ofmobilizing savings and investing them in shares and otherfinancialinstruments.Individualscan generally deal with the Fund or Trust
directly. Because of a policy of diversification investing in units or mutuals
is less risky than playing on the stock market. But, theoretically at least,
shares are more liquid than units since the former have a ready market.
ÿÿÿÿOther
nonbankfinancial intermediaries also perform a similar function. They
take our savings and putthemwherethey earn a profit. But they do not do any business directly -- They do
not 'produce' goods and services.
ÿÿÿÿWhatdistinguishesabankfromanonbank financial intermediary is deposit taking.Nonbankfinancial intermediaries
take our money and give back a paper, a 'financial instrument'.Sometimesthisinstrumenthas a market. In that case it is more liquid
than financial instruments which must be held till maturity, to be redeemed by
the issuing institution. Bank deposits arethemostliquid.Financial instruments also differ from one another in divisibility,transaction costs and price predictability.12 Bank deposits are perfectly
divisible and, generally speaking, have no transaction costs.
ÿÿÿÿAll
this made commercial banks the ideal financial intermediaries in the past. But
things are changing. In advanced economies the /span>role of typical commercial banks in transferring funds from fund
owners to fund users is declining. Banks are losing ground to other financial
institutions which are marketing innovative 'financial products'. Banks have
responded, where the law permits13, byenteringthe securities business. Structured
securitised credit is fast replacing simple bank loans.14
Securitisation is taking a step
backfrompure financial intermediation15. This and other recenttrendstowards
'disintermediation'16should not,however, create the false impression that the days of pure
intermediation are over. The complex needs of an ever expanding global diverse
economy is givingbirth to other new
varieties of intermediation. Modern society needs that whole range of options
be available to savers and funds users: pureintermediationthroughnonpure forms to direct finance. Disappearance of any option would entail
loss of opportunity and decrease in savings and investment.
Non Pure Financial Intermediation
ÿÿÿÿReserving
the term 'pure' financial intermediation to what has been described above we
shall now proceed toexaminefinancialintermediationthrough some
traditional Islamic contracts like Bai'bithaman 'Ajil (credit-sale) salam, istisna (pre-paid
purchase) and ijara (leasing).
ÿÿÿÿAs
we noted above the essence of financial intermediation is transfer of funds
from their owners to theirusers,involvinginbetween a 'transformation' in
term of time horizon, size of funds, risks profile etc. to tailor the offers to
the needs of various users. Those effecting this transfer andtransformationarecalledintermediaries.But it is obvious that the contracts mentioned above were, in the
first instance, contracts made directly by owners of money capital with users
of money capital. No intermediation was involved. In their original form all
the four contracts mentioned above are cases of direct finance.
ÿÿÿÿAn
intermediary can come into these contracts thesame way as in al mudarib yudarib. In that case the intermediary
A takes money from the fund owner B with the promise ofputtingit toprofitable useandsharing the profit with him. He gives the money to the fund user C who
invests it in his industrial or commercial project promising to share the
profit with A. Profits accruing to use offunds, i.e.increase in value
realized by investing B's savingsareshared by C, B, and A.
Cgets it because of hissuccessful effort tocreatemorewealth, B gets it for his
funds which were not only saved but exposed to risks and A gets it for his
selection of the right business to put B's money in -- a task rightly
characterized as an act ofentrepreneurship.17Thesamemodel can be applied to salam
and istisna. Some producers (among them C) are looking for some one who
would pay for his product now and take delivery in future. Some traders or
users of that product with funds (among them B) are looking for opportunity of
ensuring future delivery of that product at (aprobablylowerthan current) price paid now. Direct deals
are slow and costly. A steps in to make money by dealing with Bs and Cs. He
enters into salam / istisna contracts with C as well as B. For B he
isasellertakingmoney in advance. For C he is a buyer paying
moneyinadvance.Ahimself is neither a producer nor a user of
the product concerned. He is an intermediary likeA in the example given in the previous paragraph.
ÿÿÿÿTakingadvantageofpooling risk, better
information and faster communication A is likely to offer better terms to C as
well as B, yet earn money for himself.
ÿÿÿÿTo
the best of my knowledge there is no specific prohibition of intermediation in Salam/
Istisna. A is not violating any rules of Shari'ah.18
ÿÿÿÿIt
should be noted however that the intermediary in this case is taking business
risks not involved in 'pure' financial intermediation based on two tier
mudaraba.19
ÿÿÿÿThesamemodel is applicable to simple sale on credit. There are Cs looking for
buyers and Bs lookingfor sellers but
Cs want to sell cash where as Bs want to buy on credit,knowingfullywellthatcreditpricesareÿ
generally higher than cash prices. Direct deals are not possible due to
lack of coincidence. In comes A with some money (which could belong to other
fund owners) A buys cash from C and sells on credit to B at a higher price to
be paid at a future date.
ÿÿÿÿIn
this case too the intermediary takes direct business risks. He is not a 'pure'
intermediary.
ÿÿÿÿIs
this the murabaha we are familiar with in Islamic banking?Yes and no. Yes because A seeks profits
through purchase and resale with amarkup.No because A's activity
need not depend on B's promise to buy. An amir bi'l Shira' (one who
orders a purchase) is not absolutely necessary for financial intermediation
through sale on credit. There seems to be nothing wrong,however,inreceiving such promises, even
seeking them, as long as the promise is not part of the sale contract.
ÿÿÿÿLeasing
too is vulnerable to the same kind of manipulation. There are fund owners
seeking opportunities of making some profit. There are would be users of
durable goods (cars, air planes, oil tankers, etc.) not ableornotwilling to buy the durable
but ready to rent it. Steps in the intermediary A who takes fund owners' (B's)
money on profit-sharing basis, buys the durable and leases it to the user
(C).The rent charged would be high
enough to pay the purchase price before obsolescence of the durable, meet
insurance and maintenance costs and leave profits comparable to those
obtainable through other similar business activities.
ÿÿÿÿIn
this case also A is taking business risks to which fund owners (B) would also
be exposed. The risks are reduced substantially by the practice of buying the
durable only after a firm 'request' for lease is received from a client.
ÿÿÿÿIt
is important to note that in all cases of financial intermediation in Islamic
framework the funds owners are not guaranteed their principal. Since the fund
owner's contract with the intermediary is always based on profit-sharing
(mudaraba) he is always vulnerable to loss. There can be no guarantee of
principal amounts for profit seeking fund owners. To maneuver that guarantee
through third party intervention or deposit insurance is an entirely different
matter.
Current Practice of Islamic Banks
It is sometimes asserted20 that in the beginning, that is in
mid seventies, Islamic banks tried to practice profit-sharing with their
clients but it did not work for a number of reasons. No documentary evidences
is, however,available tosupport this claim.21Whatever the history, currently the practice ofprofit-sharing is insignificant.Despite a claim that it is increasing,22 Islamicbankingremainsdominatedby murabaha followed by leasing. Islamic bankshave alsobeendealing in real
estate,bullion and currencies. Most of
the losses sustained by Islamic banks in the past originated in the latter
dealings.
ÿÿÿÿSo
far as fund owners (savers) are concerned their contract with Islamic banks is
based on profit-sharing as assumed in our earlier discussion. But the
similarity ends here. Contrary to what issuggestedaboveIslamicbanks are not using credit sale, salam, istisna and
leasing as vehicles of intermediation. They are doing the real thing
themselves. In fact they have been increasingly pushed into doing so by Shari'ah
scholars who found them using thesecontractualforms toensurepredetermined returns on the fundsinvolved often through such dubious practices as buy back and mark down!
Real Business Versus Intermediation
ÿÿÿÿWhy
did the Islamicbanksnottake the course of intermediation - pure as well as non pure -- outlined
above? What would be the consequences if they do not return to intermediation
and continue with murabaha, leasing and also add salam / istisna
to these practices?
ÿÿÿÿIt
ishardlypossibletoanswerthesequestions inthisbriefpresentation which is
nearing its limits. I venture, however, to suggest the following explanations.
1.ÿÿÿ The
theory of interest-free banking expounded innonArabic writings focused on
pure financial intermediation based on two tiermudarabatotheneglect of non pure forms of intermediation23,somethingwhichresulted in that theory being side lined by
some practitioners.
2.ÿÿÿ Arabic
writings, with only a few exceptions,24 suggested mobilizing savings on the basis of mudaraba and
using thefundssoacquired to earn profits through trade, commerce and industry25 a tendency reflected in the
charters of early Islamic banks.26
3.ÿÿÿ IndividualIslamicbanks inArabcountrieswere established as small companies with little support from the legal
system and the banking authorities. This made it difficult for them to deal
with clients (businessmen) as intermediaries. They opted for either doing
business themselves or seeking guaranteed returns through murabaha and
leasing.
4.ÿÿÿ Islamic
jurists have never been comfortable with the role of middlemen regarding it as
superfluous if not positively harmful fortheinterests of the consumers
as well as that of the producers. The failure to distinguishbetween beneficial intermediation and
middlemen seeking monopoly control may well have been rooted in certain
historical circumstances. Trade, which has been lauded in Islam, is itself
intermediation between producers and consumers.
5.ÿÿÿ Shari'ah
scholars approached the issue not in macroeconomic terms of the Islamic
society's need for financial services required in a modern expanding economy
but at the micro level of how a financial firm,theIslamicbank, should conduct itself according to the
familiar fiqh rules of transaction.
ÿÿÿÿAll
this keeps Islamic banks focusedondoingwhatthey are not equipped to do -- real industrial or agricultural
production, trade, commerce, etc. It also keeps them away from what they would
be able to do as financialinstitutions
--- doing financial intermediation and offeringrelatedfinancialservices. I do not think Islamic banks are
going to gain by reinforcing their role as 'real traders'. It will only
accelerate their marginalisation and facilitate thetakeover of financialintermediation byinterest based
multinationals.
Structure of the Islamic Financial
Community
ÿÿÿÿSome
of the current travails of Islamic banks are related to the internal structure
of the group. The structure as it exists grew unplanned. As at present it is
not conducive to efficiency and growth. It may be also wantinginfairness. Since we have already run out of space I will confine myself
to putting on record the main points causing worry.
1.ÿÿÿ Banking
companies handling public money must be properly supervised. How can
conventional central banks discharge this function and to what extent there is
a need for some supranational agency advising national authorities in view of
the special nature of Islamic banks, needs attention.
2.ÿÿÿ Shari'ah
boards came up toensureShari'ahconformity in operation and enhance the credibility of Islamic
banks. But their multiplicity, confidentiality and other aspects of their
functioning are raising many questions. A review and restructuring is needed.
3.ÿÿÿ Islamic
bankingpracticelackstransparency.Whateveritsjustification in the infancy of Islamic financialmovement, it is now doingmore harmthan good. Islamic banks must follow internationally recognized
practices of reporting and openness.
ÿÿÿÿStandardization
of accounting procedures which is already underway, increased transparency,
propersupervisionanda fresh approach to ensuring Shari'ah conformity will go a long
way in improving efficiencyand
restoring credibility of Islamic banks. But it will not solve the tricky issue
of depositors' participation in management. The nature of investment account is
different from the savings and time deposits in conventional banks. Depositors'
vulnerability to risk of lossmakesitnecessary to give them a say in the running
of Islamic banks along with the shareholders. Some special arrangements have to
be made for this.
Where do we go from here?
ÿÿÿÿA
correction of course seems to be inevitable. A return to financial
intermediation should be on top of the agenda. Greater cooperation among
Islamic banks and pooling of resources to meet liquidity needs, etc. are
preconditions totheir successful
practice of profit-sharing on the assets side. Cost reducing innovation and
bringing new financial products to the market based on securitisation should
also receive professional attention. Economy thrives by competition not
command. Competitiveness can be boosted by decentralization of management and
encouragement to innovation. Ensuring conformity from above does not provide
the right environment for these. Internalization of Islamic norms coupled with
a minimum of ground rules would be more conducive to survival and growth.
Post Script*
ÿÿÿÿIt
is time to put the question of theneed
offinancialintermediation behind us. As we enter the new century we must
consider how to makeÿ financialintermediation in Islamic framework meet the
challenges posed by a globalize, hence more competitive environment. Thiscanbe possible only through innovation. It has been financial
innovationsenhancingliquidity,transference of risk and generation of revenues which havechangedthe market environment in recent years27. To be able to survive in the
market, "Islamic finance must find a way to perform certain functions of
conventional finance if it is to compete successfully. Among these are
functions achieved by risk management devices, marketable securities, accounts
receivable financing , preferred stock and a futures market."28
ÿÿÿÿHopefully,
several recent studies affirm the possibility of innovative financial
engineering in Islamic framework29. This framework is definedbyclearlyrecognizedpropertyrights, well defined
limits e.g. prohibition of interest on loans and a mandate to promote the good
(maslaha). There is ample scope for both adapting conventional
instruments by cleansing themoffeaturesnot acceptable in Islamic framework or designing new oneswithin Islamic perimeters.
ÿÿÿÿA
healthy financial market for trading in instruments such as common stock, Ijara
bonds30, service bonds31, financial papers based on salam
and istisna and other securities acceptable within the Islamic framework
is also necessary for the efficient functioning of Islamic banks and other
financial intermediaries. For one thing, such a market will provide
_________________________
*ÿÿÿDecember
1999
the needed outlet for
institutional investors -- mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies
- whose role is increasing day by day. But even more important is the need of
the intermediaries, including deposit taking intermediaries like the Islamic
banks, for such a market32.
That such a market does not exist at the present is because of a number of
causes. The Islamic financial community is, relatively speaking, too small. The
needed leadership for making quantum jumps is not in sight. The required
marriage of shariah expertisewith
financial professionalism is yet to consummate. And, above all, the environment
in the larger Islamic community, of which the financial community and its
appendages e.g. shariah boards,researchers,conference makers
etc, are but a part, still feels ill at ease with innovation.
ÿÿÿÿAs
we have noted else where33
the malaise is deep and requires a long term comprehensive strategy for its
cure. Yet the pincer head may well be the needs of the financial community.
After all it is Islamic finance that is,ontheeve of the 21st country, the most visible offshoot of
the Islamic resurgence spanning the last two centuries. The necessity of
innovation within Islamicframeworkfor survival may well
provide the big push for which ijtihad /span>has presumably been waiting all these centuries!
Footnotes
1.ÿÿÿ Attiyah,
Jamaluddin,al Bunuk of Islamiyah
bain al Hurriyah wa'l Tanzeem, al Taqleed wa'l Ijtihad, al Nazariyah wa'l
Tatbeeq.
/span>.ÿÿÿZineldin, Mosad, The Economics of
Money and Banking: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Islamic Interest-Free
Banking.
/span>.ÿÿÿKazarian, Elias, Finance and Economic
Development: Islamic Banking in Egypt.
/span>.ÿÿÿSiddiqi, Mohammad Nejatullah, Mushkilat
al Bunuk al-Islamiyah fi'l waqt al Hadir.
/span>.ÿÿÿAl Hussayyen,Shaikh Saleh, "al Bunuk al Islamiyah Muhadedadah bi'l
Tawaqquf".
/span>.ÿÿÿMuhammad, Yusuf Kamal, al Masrafiyah
al Islamiyah, al Azmah wa'l Makhraj.
2.ÿÿÿ We ignore questions specifically related
to Islamic banking at the national level in Pakistan, Iran,Sudanand,partially,Malaysiasince the space assigned for this study can not accomodate the relevant
issues.
3.ÿÿÿ Pierce, James L., Monetary and
Financial Economics, p. 89.
4.ÿÿÿ Fry, Maxwell J., Money, Interest and
Banking in Economic Development, p. 235.
5.ÿÿÿ Townsend, Robert M., "Financial
Structure and Economic Activity"in American Economic Review, Vol. 73, December 1983, page 909.
6.ÿÿÿ Bryant,Ralph C., International Financial Intermediation,pp. 8-11 for these and other advantages of
intermediation.
7.ÿÿÿ al Mudawi, Baqir, "Placing Medium
and Long Term Finance by Islamic Financial Institutions"
ÿÿÿÿalso see Waqar Masood Khan, Towards
an Interest-Free Islamic Financial System.
8.ÿÿÿ See Chapters one and two, Role of
State in the Economy, An Islamic Perspective, by the present author.
9.ÿÿÿ Ibn Taymiyah, al Siyasah al Shar'iyah
fi ahwal al Ra'i wa'l Ra'iyah.
10.ÿÿ This is the well known case ofal mudarib yudarib. For a discussion
see the present author's, Partnership and Profit-Sharing in Islamic Law, pp.
57-63.
Some of the
original Fiqh sources are
.ÿÿÿÿ al Sarakhsi, al Mabsut, Egypt,
Matbaa Saadah, Vol. 22, pp. 98-104.
.ÿÿÿÿ al Kasani, al Bada'i Wa'l Sanai',
Vol. 6, p. 97.
.ÿÿÿÿ al Sawi, Bulghat al Salik li Aqrab
al Masalik, Vol. 2, p. 232.
.ÿÿÿÿ al Firozabadi, al Shirazi, Kitab al
Muhadhdhab fi fiqh Madh hab al Imam al Shafa'i, Vol. 1, p. 290.
.ÿÿÿÿ Ibn Qudama, al Mughni, 1347 H.
Vol. 5, p. 161.
11.ÿÿ Allen, Franklin and Anthony M. Santomero, What
Do Financial Intermediaries Do? p. 2.
12.ÿÿ Pierce, J.L., Monetary and Financial
Economics.
13.ÿÿ The Repeal of Glass-Steagall in the US
removed the last hurdles in this regard.
14.ÿÿ Bryan, Lowell L., 'Structured Securitized
Credit: A Superior Technology for Lending' in Donald Chew (ed.), New
Developments in Commercial Banking, p. 55.
ÿÿÿÿAlso in the same book 'The Future of
Credit Securitization and the Financial Services Industry' by Juan Mocampo and
others.
15.ÿÿ Allen, Franklin and Anthony M. Santomero, What
Do Financial Intermediaries Do? p. 6.
16.ÿÿ Goldberg, Harold H., et. al. 'Asset
Securitization and Corporate Financial Health' in Donald Chew (ed), p. 94.
17.ÿÿ Knight, Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty and
Profit, Chapter 11, 12, and 13.
18.ÿÿ It may be noted that even though one can
not sell what he does not posses, it is permissible to undertake delivery of a
commodity in future not in possession of the seller and not being produced by
him as long as supplies are available in the market.
19.
It is
possible, however, to hedge against these risks, but we can not enter into
discussion of that possibility in this study.
20.ÿÿ Attiyah, Jamaluddin, al Bunukal Islamiya
. . . ., pp. 108-112.
21.ÿÿ Mumammad, Yusuf Kamal, al Masrafiyah al
Islamiya . . . ., pp. 104-105.
22.ÿÿ Shaikh, Samir Abid, Secretary General,
International Association of Islamic Banks, Press statement in response to
Shaikh Saleh al Hussayyen, op. cit.
23.ÿÿ Uzair, Muhammad, An Outline of
Interestless Banking.
ÿÿÿÿSiddiqi , Mohammad Nejatullah, Banking
Without Interest, For other references see the present author's, Muslim
Economic Thinking.
24.ÿÿ Al Araby, Mohammad Abdullah, "al
Mu'amalat al Masrafiyah al Mu'asarah wa Ra'y al Islam fih", pp.
79-122.
25.ÿÿ Al Jammal, Gharib, al Masarif wa Buyut
al Tamweel al Islamiyah, pp. 46, 59, and 65-69.
26.ÿÿ See the Charters ofDubaiIslamic Bank, Kuwait Finance House, Faisal IslamicBank of Sudan,and Faisal Islamic Bank of
Egypt clauses numbers 2, 2, 4, and 2 respectively.
27.ÿÿ Iqbal, Zamir,
'Financial Engineering in Islamic Finance', pp. 542-43.
28.ÿÿ Vogel, Frank, and Samul L. Hayes III, Islamic
Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return, p. 236.
29.ÿÿ Kamali, Mohamamd Hashim, 'Prospects for an
Islamic Derivatives Market in Malasiya'.
.ÿÿÿÿ ______________________, Islamic
Commercial Law: Analysis of Futures.
.ÿÿÿÿ ______________________, Islamic
Commercial Law: Analysis of options.
.ÿÿÿÿ Ebrahim, Muhammad Shahid,
"Integrating Islamic and Conventional Project Finance'.
.ÿÿÿÿ Obaidullah, Muhammed, "Financial
Engineering with Islamic Options".
.ÿÿÿÿ Bacha, Obiyathullah Ismath,
"Derivative Instruments and Islamic Finance: Some Thought for a
Reconstruction".
.ÿÿÿÿ lqbal, Zamir, "Financial
Engineering in Islamic Finance".
.ÿÿÿÿ Kotbi, Hussain E., Financial
Engineering for Islamic Banks.
.ÿÿÿÿ Khan, Mohammed Fahim, Islamic Futures
and Their Markets
.ÿÿÿÿ Bin Eid, Mohammad Algari, 'Stock
Exchange Transactions: Shariah Viewpoints".
.ÿÿÿÿ Usmani, Muhammad Taqi, An
Introduction to IslamicFinance,especiallypp. 157-232.
30.ÿÿ For this instrument and those based on salam
and istisna, see Ahmad, Ausaf and Trariqullah Khan (eds.), Islamic
Financial Instruments for Public Sector Resource Mobilisation, Chapter 5 to
10.
ÿÿÿÿAlso
ÿÿÿÿHaque, Nadeemul and Abbas Mirakhor,
"The Design of Instruments for Government Finance in an Islamic
Economy".
31.ÿÿ Monzer Kahf, 'Service Bonds for Financing
Public Utilities'.
32.ÿÿ Vide Allen, Franklin and Anthony M.
Santomero, p. 1.
33.ÿÿ Siddiqi, M.N., "Towards Regeneration:
Shifting Priorties in Islamic Movements".
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